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THE PRESENT RESEARCH INVESTIGATES how al-cohol and group processes combine to affect people’s
engagement in risk when alone or in groups. Research on
the effects of alcohol focuses largely on individuals. As a
result of drinking alcohol, individuals are more likely to
take risks (McMillen and Wells-Parker, 1987), be sexually
irresponsible (Stall et al., 1986), be aggressive (Pernanen,
1991) and emotional (Hull, 1981; Stritzke et al., 1996), and
drive dangerously (Guppy, 1994). Alcohol consumption is
particularly high among younger people (Office for Na-
tional Statistics, 2000), most often as part of a social activ-
ity (Aitkin, 1985; Morojele and Stephenson, 1994).
Damaging effects of alcohol are well documented. Research
in Sweden, for example, shows that between 28% and 44%
of unnatural deaths may be associated with alcohol, with
more than twice as many men affected as women (Sjögren
et al., 2000).
In the current research, we consider how group processes
combine with alcohol consumption to affect risk attraction
ABSTRACT. Objective: The objective of the present study is to as-
sess the impact of alcohol consumption on the risk orientation of people
when they are in groups as opposed to alone. Alcohol is often consumed
within social groups, but previous research has not distinguished whether
particular group processes affect risk differently as a consequence of
alcohol consumption. Three theory-based predictions are tested to see
whether, after alcohol consumption, groups encourage or inhibit risk as
a result of group polarization, deindividuation, or group monitoring.
Method: Male participants (N = 120; ages 18-28), recruited via oppor-
tunity sample from students at the University of Kent, were assigned as
individuals or as members of four-person groups. They had their breath
alcohol concentration analyzed to ensure they were alcohol free and then
were asked to consume either a placebo or alcohol in amounts equiva-
lent to the legal limit for driving in the United States and the United
Kingdom (.08% blood alcohol concentration). Participants completed
a risk-attraction task either alone or in a group. Each participant also
completed an alcohol-expectancy questionnaire. Results: Individuals
found risky choices significantly more attractive after consuming alco-
hol. In contrast, members of groups showed no such increase. In alco-
hol but not placebo conditions, groups made their decisions more slowly
than did individuals. Conclusions: The results are consistent with the
group-monitoring hypothesis (i.e., that group members attend to each
other and promote a greater level of systematic processing of the risks
presented). Results indicate that with moderate social drinking, groups
may provide an informal means of mutual regulation and monitoring
that can offset some aspects of alcohol myopia. (J. Stud. Alcohol 67:
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among young people. Drinking within groups is a ubiqui-
tous part of our modern social setting. It is not uncommon
for people to make decisions as part of a group while con-
suming alcohol (e.g., in business meetings, at conferences,
etc.). Surprisingly little research has been conducted into
this phenomenon; thus, this area would benefit from sys-
tematic examination. Pharmacological and social psycho-
logical processes both may affect risky behavior. High levels
of alcohol intake will impair judgmental accuracy and con-
sistency (Mongrain and Standing, 1989). In addition, very
strong social pressure can cause sober people to ignore or
misperceive critical information (Abrams and Hogg, 1990).
The more typical situation, however, may involve moder-
ate alcohol intake and informal social pressure (e.g., drink-
ing during social leisure time or with a work-associate over
lunch). With moderate alcohol intake, pharmacological and
social processes are likely to combine or interact to affect
behavior, rather than one set of processes dominating.
Different countries define the “safe” limit of alcohol in-
take for driving differently. In the United Kingdom and the
United States, the current limit is generally 80 milligrams
alcohol per 100 milliliters blood (0.35 mg/l breath), whereas
in most mainland European countries the level is lower, at
50 mg alcohol per 100 ml blood. Given that the limit may
represent a socially acceptable threshold for drinking, we
were interested in how this level of intake affects judg-
ments made by groups.
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According to Steele and Josephs’s (1990) “alcohol myo-
pia” model, alcohol makes social behavior more extreme,
because it blocks response conflicts by reducing cognitive
constraints on affective preferences. The same process can
also inflate self-evaluations. Alcohol myopia combines with
distracting activity to reduce anxiety and depression by di-
verting attention from the thoughts and feelings underlying
negative states. Fromme et al. (1997) argued that following
alcohol consumption, relatively automatic expectation of a
positive outcome tends to persist, whereas the systematic
processing required to evaluate potential negative outcomes
declines. As a result, people become riskier in their choices.
Although alcohol may increase positive expectancies be-
cause of its pharmacological effects, even the belief that
one has consumed alcohol may be sufficient to inhibit sys-
tematic processing of potentially negative outcomes (Stacy,
1995). Thus, people may become riskier, simply because
they think they are drinking alcohol (an alcohol expectancy
effect).
Fromme et al. (1997) compared the effects of alcohol
and a placebo in an experiment examining outcome ex-
pectancies in various risky scenarios. The intoxicated (but
not the placebo) participants underestimated the likelihood
of negative consequences from risky situations; this result
is consistent with other evidence that alcohol inhibits sys-
tematic cognitive processing (Steele and Josephs, 1990).
Alcohol did not affect expectancies of positive outcomes.
Fromme et al. (1997) did not measure alcohol expectancies
directly, however, and therefore it remains unclear whether
the levels of expectancy differed between those conditions.
Fillmore and Blackburn (2002) observed that participants
with higher alcohol expectancy tried to compensate for their
supposed intake of alcohol (e.g., by speeding their reaction
times on a reaction time task); however, this was accompa-
nied by decreased inhibition.
How might alcohol and group versus individual deci-
sion making combine to affect risk attraction? To investi-
gate this question, the present experiment asked participants
who were alone or in four-person groups to indicate their
attraction to risk, after they had consumed either a placebo
or alcohol. We measured participants’ attraction to risk over
a series of decisions, as well as the time they took to make
decisions. There are at least three mechanisms within groups
that might moderate the effects of alcohol on the attractive-
ness of risk (Abrams et al., 1997). These are (1) group
polarization/extremity shift, (2) deindividuation, and (3)
group monitoring. Each mechanism might have a distinct
profile of effects on the measures of risk attraction and
decision time. The following predictions were formulated
based on previous theory in social psychology. We recog-
nize that these predictions may be contingent on various
factors that were not directly manipulated in the present
research, but they provide a useful framework for consider-
ing how alcohol and group process effects may combine.
Group polarization
Consensus formation causes groups to arrive at more
extreme conclusions than the average initial tendency of
their individual members (Kerr et al., 1975; Moscovici and
Zavalloni, 1969; Zuber et al., 1992). Steele and Josephs’s
(1990) alcohol myopia model and Fromme et al.’s (1997)
research suggest that individuals who have consumed alco-
hol will become more attracted to risk than those who have
not. They will consider a more restricted (and positive)
range of possible outcomes when making their decisions
about risk, and, therefore, their initial tendency will be shift-
ing toward risk. Assuming that risk has a more positive
value when people have been drinking alcohol and a lower
value when they have not (see also Sayette et al., 2004),
we may expect an interaction effect involving an effect of
alcohol that is larger for groups. Risk attraction among
groups of drinkers could be expected to be more extreme
than among individual drinkers (i.e., group membership
would push to the extreme the individual’s tendency to be-
come riskier).
It is also conceivable that risk attraction could be re-
duced (i.e., consolidating an initial tendency to caution) in
a sober group relative to sober individuals. We recognize
that a relevant issue here is the initial tendency. Our pre-
dictions are based on the presumption that initial tenden-
cies are relatively conservative. Regardless of this
presumption, the polarization prediction is that any effect
of alcohol versus placebo on individuals should be magni-
fied in groups, implying a significant interaction effect.
How might group polarization affect decision time? We
are not aware of direct evidence on this issue, but some
indirect evidence seems relevant. Assuming that alcohol
myopia militates against systematic consideration of poten-
tially negative outcomes, it seems probable that alcohol
might cause individuals to make decisions rather more
quickly than when sober. A group of individuals that does
not engage in systematic consideration of the risks simi-
larly may spend less time deliberating over its decisions
than a group of individuals that does engage in systematic
processing. Thus, if group-polarization effects arise, it seems
likely there should be a significant effect of alcohol (faster
decisions) and that this should be qualified by an interaction
such that the effect is larger among groups than individuals.
Deindividuation
A second possible mechanism is deindividuation,
whereby group members become less self-conscious and
less inhibited than individuals acting alone. Alcohol and
group membership may have concordant effects in terms
of deindividuation, because both variables can reduce
individuals’ self-awareness and inhibition. Other members
of a group demand attention, leaving less capacity for
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self-attention and self-regulation (Diener, 1980). Indeed,
meta-analytic evidence is consistent with the idea that being
embedded in a group can cause reduced self-attention and
self-regulation (Mullen, 1986). In this deindividuated state,
group members may well be guided more by emergent and
transitory group norms than by personal preferences or
goals. Deindividuation has been found to increase the level
of nonnormative, antisocial, violent, and racist behavior (Di-
ener, 1980; Mullen, 1986), consistent with a reduced con-
cern over the consequences of behavior. In addition, alcohol
(but not alcohol expectancy) may reduce self-attention and
may increase positive expectations for the self (Hull, 1981;
Hull et al., 1983). As a result, we expected that both group
membership and alcohol could increase risk attraction and
that the effects would be additive. In this case, there should
be significant main effects of both group membership and
alcohol and no interaction between them.
In contrast to the group-polarization hypothesis, deindi-
viduation processes should result in slower decision times
for groups and for drinkers. In fact, it seemed likely that
deindividuation could render the decision process noisier
and more disjointed, with the result that people become
distracted from the task by other cues in the situation. This
seemed a more likely outcome within a group (which pro-
vides more distractions), but it also seemed a reasonable
hypothesis for individuals. In summary, if deindividuation
affects risk attraction because of lowered self-awareness, it
should also result in slower decision times. This would re-
sult in main effects of alcohol and group context such that
decision times are slower when people have consumed al-
cohol and when they are in groups. We recognize that the
effect of group also may be affected by process loss (Steiner,
1972); therefore we cannot be sure about the relative size
of these two effects.
Group monitoring
The third process that seems relevant is group monitor-
ing. Groups can improve the decisions made by members
by providing intellectual resources on which all the mem-
bers can draw. Groups solve problems by means of a pro-
cess in which one or two members identify an optimal
solution, and the other group members recognize it as such
(Laughlin and Ellis, 1986; Lorge and Solomon, 1955). In
principle, floor and ceiling effects are possible with group
monitoring. On very easy or nondemanding tasks, it is un-
likely that being in a group would provide any improve-
ment in outcome. With more demanding tasks, however,
group monitoring should mean that groups reach more op-
timal solutions (cf. Hopthrow and Hulbert, 2005). Tasks
can become more demanding either by increasing their com-
plexity or by reducing the individual’s capacity to tackle
them (in the present case by administering alcohol). On
extremely complex tasks, it could be that the combination
of task demands and individual functioning would mean
that sober groups are able to reach solutions better than
sober individuals but that intoxicated individuals and groups
would both fail to solve the task. In the present study, the
task is not at an “insoluble” level and is one that has been
used previously to demonstrate variability in decisions and
judgments (Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1968). Therefore, par-
ticipants should be able to reach a decision but could also
be expected to draw on opinions and considerations raised
by other group members to inform their judgments.
According to our group-monitoring hypothesis, even if
moderately intoxicated group members are less self-atten-
tive than sober group members, they may attend to others
and be reminded that perspectives other than their own
should be weighed in a decision. Moreover, group mem-
bers may be called upon to justify their own judgments to
the group (cf. Williams et al., 1981). These factors seem
likely to promote systematic processing of the risks. As a
result, mutual monitoring within the group may compen-
sate for the effects of alcohol on the individuals’ propen-
sity to abandon systematic consideration of risks. Whereas
individuals might be expected to become riskier after con-
suming alcohol, groups may promote systematic process-
ing through discussion and thus remain at the level of risk
attraction that characterizes sober individuals. If this oc-
curs, we would expect an interaction such that the risk-
enhancing effect of alcohol only occurs within individuals.
If group monitoring takes place, alcohol consumption is
likely to make it more difficult and time consuming to
achieve. In particular, group members who have consumed
alcohol need to sustain one another’s attention on the pa-
rameters of the decision task and not merely accept indi-
viduals’ initial inclination toward risk. Therefore, if group
monitoring is occurring, we would expect the decision time
to be longer when group members have consumed alcohol
than when they have not. This prediction coincides to some
extent with the deindividuation prediction but for quite dif-
ferent reasons. Moreover, the group-monitoring prediction
suggests that longer decision times will follow alcohol con-
sumption only within the group condition, because no moni-
toring can take place in the individual condition. Thus, we
would expect an interaction effect, because the effect of
alcohol (slower decisions) is larger, and it may be present
solely within the group condition.
We know of only one other study (conducted concur-
rently with our own) that examined the effect of alcohol on
a group risk decision. That study (Sayette et al., 2004) com-
pared three-person groups in a placebo or alcohol condi-
tion. Participants all received a fixed fee for participation.
Groups were given the choice of whether to flip a coin that
could result in either a doubling or removal of a require-
ment to complete questionnaires that would take 30 min-
utes. Of the nine placebo groups, one opted to flip the coin,
whereas six of the nine alcohol groups did so. At first sight,
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this finding suggests that a deindividuation process may
have prevailed. The study did not include any individual
conditions, however, and thus does not illuminate how groups
and individuals differ in the responses to alcohol. In addi-
tion, the risk decision was a single decision involving a judg-
ment that had a less analytical basis than the series of complex
decisions used in this study. The latter, we think, might be
more typical of the types of judgment made in a social group
over a period of time (e.g., over the course of a meeting).
In summary, this research was designed to examine the
effect of alcohol on risk attraction within groups and for
individuals. We were particularly interested to find out to
what extent alcohol affects groups in line with the group-
polarization, deindividuation, or group-monitoring hypoth-
eses. We tested whether, after drinking alcohol, groups were
more or less attracted to risk than individuals. We also
examined whether, relative to individuals, groups required
more or less time to reach their decisions after they had
consumed alcohol. The group-polarization and deindividu-
ation hypotheses expect groups to become riskier after con-
suming alcohol, whereas the group-monitoring hypothesis
does not. The group-polarization hypothesis expects groups
to reach their risk decisions more quickly after alcohol,
whereas the deindividuation and group-monitoring theories




Procedures were approved by ethical review panels and
complied with the guidelines of the British Psychological
Society and American Psychological Association. Young
male adults represent the highest risk category for alcohol
use (Office for National Statistics, 2000). Therefore, we
recruited 120 male undergraduate students at the Univer-
sity of Kent who were not studying psychology, ages 18-
28. Recruitment was primarily achieved by means of a
staffed desk soliciting volunteers as students left the uni-
versity library. Four-person groups were formed (n = 96;
24 groups); the remaining 24 students participated as indi-
viduals. Participants were informed, prior to agreeing to
take part in the research, that they might receive “a moder-
ate amount of alcohol in a controlled setting,” and would
receive a standard fee (£10 [approximately U.S. $17]) for
their participation. No mention was made of groups or in-
dividuals. Participants were screened using a revised Alco-
hol Use Disorders Identification Test (AUDIT; Saunders et
al., 1993). Only those who ordinarily drank low to moder-
ate amounts of alcohol were allowed to participate. Partici-
pants were asked to drink no alcohol for 18 hours and eat
no food for 3 hours prior to the study. They were informed
that hot food would be available at the end of the session.
Measures and procedure
On arrival at the laboratory, participants were taken to
an individual cubicle where they were weighed before be-
ing briefed on the format of the session. They signed a
medical screening and consent form. It was explained to
them that although they could withdraw from the study at
any time, they would be required to stay within the labora-
tory until instructed by the experimenters. It was also ex-
plained that their time in the laboratory would be monitored
and recorded with video cameras and small microphones.
Participants then had their breath alcohol concentration
(BrAC) analyzed to ensure that they had no alcohol in their
bloodstream prior to the experiment. Those for whom the
test revealed alcohol were thanked for their time and asked
to leave. For practical and procedural efficiency, alcohol
and placebo conditions were conducted in separate sessions.
The type of session and implementation of individual or group
conditions within sessions were assigned randomly, however.
Participants were given a very strong tasting lozenge
(“Fisherman’s Friend”) to disguise the taste of the drink. In
the alcohol condition, participants were given 6 minutes to
drink a mixture of vodka (40% alcohol by volume at 1.13g
of ethanol per kg of body weight) mixed with equal parts
orange juice and tonic water. Pilot testing found this amount
of ethanol was the most reliable to ensure that participants
were intoxicated at the .08% BAC (based upon conversion
from breath alcohol concentration) level across a large range
of body weights. In the placebo condition, they drank a
tonic water and orange juice mix with 2 ml of vodka floated
on the surface (an insufficient quantity to register in a BrAC
test using a Lion SD400 alcometer [Lion Laboratories Ltd.,
Barry, Wales, United Kingdom]). This method of adminis-
tration, including the timing of the drinking phase, was
adapted from previous studies (Maylor and Rabbitt, 1993;
Maylor et al., 1990). Fillmore and Weafer (2004) also used
a similar time frame for consuming the alcohol (i.e., 6 min-
utes). The liquid mixture was given to participants in equally
dosed glasses, spaced across a 6-minute interval. Partici-
pants were told that they should not find it uncomfortable
to drink the required amount in 6 minutes. Moreover, they
were instructed that if they did experience any unpleasant
effects, they should stop drinking right away and would not
forfeit their participation fee. In fact, only one person indi-
cated he wished to withdraw. This person was debriefed
thoroughly and asked to stay at the laboratory until suffi-
cient alcohol had been eliminated from his bloodstream.
Participants viewed a video of comedy shows for 40 min-
utes, during the alcohol absorption phase, prior to the data
collection phase of the experiment. They then had their
BrAC analyzed a second time. Average BAC in the alcohol
condition at this time was .074%.
Groups of four people were formed randomly, and the
remainder participated as individuals. Participants were then
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taken to separate soundproof rooms where they either re-
mained alone or found themselves in the company of three
other participants. In total, there were 12 groups and 12
individuals in each condition (alcohol and placebo). Par-
ticipants were screened prior to assignment to groups to
separate individuals who were previously acquainted.
Participants were then instructed in the risk attraction
task, which was a questionnaire formed of 16 duplex bets
(Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1968). A duplex bet is a form of
question that allows researchers to decompose four impor-
tant components of risky decisions (amount that could be
won and the probability of winning that amount, amount
that could be lost and the probability of losing that amount)
into a single rating item. One of the 16 items used in this
study, for example, was “An 80% chance to win £4 [U.S.
$7] and a 20% chance to win nothing, and an 80% chance
to lose £7 and a 20% chance to lose nothing.” The 16
duplex bets were formed by completely crossing high and
low amounts, respectively, of amount to win (£4 vs £1
[U.S. $7 vs $1.75]), probability of winning (.80 vs .20),
amount to lose (£4 vs £1), and probability of losing (.80 vs
.20). The same random ordering of bets was used for all
groups and individuals.
For each of the bets, participants rated their commit-
ment to gamble on a 10-point scale (0-9), in which higher
numbers indicate a stronger commitment to gamble. They
were told that they should make each risk decision as care-
fully as possible, because at a later stage a random set of
those bets that had been rated most highly would be played
with their own money. Thus, the decisions involved the
prospect of real losses or gains for the participants. In real-
ity, no money was gambled and all participants retained
their full fee. In the individual condition, participants com-
pleted this task alone. In the group condition, they were
instructed to make an agreed decision for each of the 16
risks. Participants indicated they had completed the task by
an agreed signal to the experimenter. The amount of time
(in seconds) taken to complete the task was recorded by
the experimenter.
Following data collection, participants remained at the
laboratory until their BAC was below .028%. All were ques-
tioned and debriefed prior to leaving the laboratory. In this
debriefing, none of the participants indicated that they had
had any doubts about the payment manipulation. Some par-
ticipants expressed relief that they had not actually lost money.
Results
Alcohol expectancy manipulation check
To check the levels of alcohol expectancy of those who
had consumed alcohol versus a placebo, we asked partici-
pants at the end of the experiment to estimate how many
units of alcohol they had consumed (conveyed in terms of
standard drinks). Alcohol expectancy estimates were sig-
nificantly lower in the placebo (mean [SD] = 1.19 [0.97])
than alcohol condition (mean = 3.073 [1.26]; t = 5.81, 46
df, p < .001; d = 1.69). A comparison of the estimates of
those in the placebo condition against the true value (zero),
however, showed that these participants believed they had
consumed a significant amount of alcohol (t = 6.03, 23 df,
p < .001; d = 1.73). Our comparisons of the effects of the
alcohol and placebo conditions, therefore, should be con-
sidered as a comparison of the effects of expectancy alone
versus expectancy plus alcohol. Expectancy estimates of
those in the placebo condition were not affected by whether
they were in the group or individual condition (t = 1.17, 22
df, p > .25).
Risk attraction
Next we considered the risk attraction ratings made by
groups and individuals of the 16 duplex bets. The data from
one group in the alcohol condition and one individual in
the placebo condition were incomplete and these were omit-
ted from the analysis of risk attraction. We initially ana-
lyzed the data with a 2 × 2 × 16 (Individual/Group ×
Condition × Trial Number) analysis of variance (ANOVA).
The ANOVA was performed with condition (alcohol/pla-
cebo) and individual/group as between-participants variables
and the 16-bet choices as a within-participants variable.
There was a significant effect of trial number (F = 155.63,
15/28 df, p < .001; partial η2 = .79); a significant effect of
condition (F = 7.48, 1/42 df, p = .009; partial η2 = .15);
and no significant effect of individual versus group (F =
0.15, 1/42 df, p = .70; partial  η2 = .004). There was, how-
ever, a significant condition by individual/group interac-
tion (F = 5.80, 1/42 df, p = .02; partial η2 = .12; mean
square error (MSE) = 9.32). The effect of trial number did
not interact significantly with condition, individual/group, or
their interaction (F’s < 1.42, p’s > .20; partial η2 < .043).
We investigated the effect of trial number to see whether
there was a practice effect over time. In fact, the correla-
tion between scores on the bets and trial number was small
and nonsignificant (r = .13, 16 df, p = .63), indicating that
there was no trend toward greater or lesser risk over trials.
The 16 bet scores formed a reliable composite scale
(Cronbach’s α = .85), and the reliability of this scale could
not be improved by removal of any items. As the bets did
not differ in complexity or difficulty, the large effect of
trial number simply reflects that participants found some
bets more attractive than others.
To check that the effects of the between-participants vari-
ables were robust across levels of bet attractiveness, we
divided the measures into two sets, creating an averaged
score for bets that were above and an averaged score for
those that were below the median level of attractiveness
(both scores had reliability coefficients above .70). ANOVA
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on each of these subsets showed that scores of individuals
were significantly higher in the alcohol compared with the
control condition (F’s = 17.71, p < .001; partial η2 = .297;
and F = 6.41, p = .015; partial η2 = .132 for low and high
attractive bets, respectively). In contrast, when participants
were in groups, the alcohol and placebo conditions did not
differ in their ratings of either the less or more attractive
bets (F’s = .087 and .014, p’s = .77 and .91; partial η2 <
.002). Therefore, we computed an averaged score of the
duplex bets by averaging for attractiveness across all the
bets. Note that the F statistics for the between-participants
effects in the preceding ANOVA are identical to the ef-
fects on this composite score.
Overall risk attraction following the consumption of al-
cohol was significantly higher (mean = 3.71 [0.71]) than
following the consumption of the placebo (mean = 3.09
[0.88]). The absence of a main effect of individual versus
group indicates that the deindividuation hypothesis was not
supported because that hypothesis assumed main effects of
both being in a group and of consuming alcohol. The sig-
nificant interaction effect leaves open the possibility, how-
ever, that either the group-polarization or group-monitoring
hypotheses could be supported.
The means for the interaction are depicted in Figure 1.
For individuals, mean levels of risk attraction for alcohol
and placebo conditions were 4.01 (0.72) and 2.85 (0.91),
respectively. In groups, the mean levels were 3.38 (0.54)
and 3.31 (0.83), respectively. The simple main effect of
condition was significant for individuals (F = 13.22, 1/42
df, p < .001; partial η2 = .239) but not groups (F = .053, 1/
42 df, p = .819; partial η2 = .001). This is consistent with
the idea that being in a group ameliorated the effect of
alcohol (i.e., the group-monitoring hypothesis). It is not con-
sistent, however, with the idea that alcohol would augment
a tendency for groups to be more extreme than individuals.
Indeed, the means in the group condition fall between the
means in the individual condition, which is the opposite
pattern to the one we expected from the polarization
hypothesis.
Decision time
For four individuals (three in the alcohol condition) and
five groups (two in the alcohol condition), the timing data
were unreliable, because participants did not signal clearly
exactly when they had completed the task. These partici-
pants were excluded from the analysis of decision times.
The overall difference between alcohol versus placebo con-
ditions was not significant (F = 3.185, 1/34 df, p > .08;
MSE = 26,434.8; partial η2 = .086). Nor was there an over-
all effect of being in a group or alone (F = 2.41 1/34 df, p
> .13; partial η2 = .066). There was, however, a significant
interaction between these two factors (F = 5.99, 1/34 df, p
< .02; partial η2 = .15). The general pattern is that groups
that had consumed alcohol took more time than either indi-
viduals or groups that consumed the placebo, as shown in
Figure 2. For individuals, mean decision times (in seconds)
for alcohol and placebo conditions were 342 (104.2) and
380 (164.9), respectively. In groups, mean times were 516
(251.6) and 312 (92.6), respectively. Simple effects analyses
FIGURE 1. Risk engagement by individuals and groups within alcohol and placebo conditions
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of this interaction show that the effect of condition was
significant for groups (F = 8.95, 1/34 df, p = .005, partial
η2 = .208) but not for individuals (F = 0.22, 1/34 df, p =
.64, partial η2 = .006).
The polarization hypothesis predicted that alcohol would
speed up decisions and that this effect would be larger when
people were in groups. The interaction effect was signifi-
cant; however, the direction of differences is opposite to
that predicted. The deindividuation hypothesis assumed that
decisions would be slowed both in the alcohol condition
and when people are in groups (i.e., two main effects).
Neither main effect was significant, however. The group-
monitoring hypothesis proposed that group decision times
would be slower in the alcohol compared with the placebo
condition. This was supported by the analysis of the simple
effects.
Last, we checked the correlation between time and risk.
This was near zero (r = .032) and nonsignificant. It is un-
derstandable that time is not linked to risk attractiveness
per se, because groups that had consumed alcohol were
taking more time to make decisions at the same level of
risk as the nonintoxicated groups.
Discussion
There is no previous experimental test of the combined
effects of alcohol consumption and group versus individual
processes on risk attraction. This experiment replicates pre-
vious evidence that isolated individuals engage in greater
risk when they have consumed alcohol (McMillen and
Wells-Parker, 1987), and that this is associated with phar-
macological effects of alcohol over and above any placebo
effects of alcohol expectancy alone (Stacy, 1995). This pat-
tern of findings previously has been attributed to the fact
that alcohol reduces the capacity to process negative (i.e.,
potential loss) outcomes systematically but does not inhibit
relatively automatic expectations for positive outcomes.
Previous research also shows that, given an initial pref-
erence among individuals, groups may arrive at more ex-
treme preferences than the average of those shown by
individuals (Kerr et al., 1975; Moscovici et al., 1969; Zuber
et al., 1992). This might also lead one to expect greater
overall risk attraction in groups that have been drinking
alcohol. In fact, we did not observe such an effect. More-
over, it could be argued that if, as a result of alcohol indi-
viduals engage in less systematic processing, and do not
devote effort to considering negative outcomes, they should
reach their decisions more quickly. This effect should also
be magnified in a group context, because groups that only
need to consider one side of an issue (be risky) are likely
to reach a decision more quickly than groups that have to
consider other arguments. Despite a slight tendency for in-
dividuals to make decisions faster after consuming alcohol,
this effect was not observed among groups. Therefore, we
find no evidence in the present data that group polarization
or extremity shifts affected risk attraction when group mem-
bers had consumed alcohol.
Previous research also shows that alcohol may cause
disinhibition and that immersion in a group may have simi-
lar effects because of reduced self-awareness. We reasoned
that this might mean that individuals and groups would
both be more attracted to risk after consuming alcohol but,
FIGURE 2. Risk decision times taken by individuals and groups within alcohol and placebo conditions
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because their behavior would be relatively unconstrained
and susceptible to random or irrelevant distractions, they
would take longer to reach their decisions. The disinhibiting
effect of alcohol on individuals was demonstrated by their
greater attraction to risk. This effect was not repeated in
groups, however. Nor were groups more inclined toward
risk, overall. In addition, there was no evidence that deci-
sions took longer as a function of alcohol or being in a
group, per se. Thus, the evidence is not consistent with a
deindividuation interpretation.
Research shows that groups can also improve judgments
and decision quality when there are objective solutions (e.g.,
understanding risks), because group members are more
likely to encounter (and recognize) correct arguments
(Laughlin and Ellis, 1986; Lorge and Solomon, 1955). This
experiment shows that, at least in this context, individuals
and groups in the placebo condition showed similar levels
of attraction to risk. It is important to note, however, that
although alcohol elevated individuals’ risk engagement, this
effect was eliminated when decisions were made by four-
person groups. This is consistent with the group-monitor-
ing interpretation, and the analysis of the simple effects
supported this idea.
Our confidence in this group-monitoring interpretation
is bolstered by the decision-time data. Individuals were, if
anything, marginally faster in making decisions when they
had consumed alcohol. In contrast, groups were slower, as
illustrated by the simple effects. It seems reasonable to think
that the groups were devoting attention to the decision prob-
lems and that by processing the decision problems more
systematically they may have overcome the tendency of
individuals to be attracted to risk.
We do not have direct evidence about the nature of in-
formation processing during this task, unfortunately. There-
fore, we recognize that there may be an alternative
explanation both for the lack of risk and the increased time
associated with the results for the group alcohol condition.
Indeed, further research would be desirable, to strengthen
our ability to distinguish between the differing explana-
tions. In addition, future research may be bolstered with a
higher level of statistical power than existed in the present
study. We are reassured by several pieces of evidence, how-
ever. First, our results in the individual condition are con-
sistent with previous evidence about the effects of alcohol
on individuals. Lone individuals appear to become more
attracted to risk as a result of drinking alcohol. This is
consistent with the evidence that, in comparison with sober
individuals, those who consumed alcohol appear less likely
to devote systematic attention to the task. Turning to the
effects of alcohol in groups, the present evidence shows
that support for either deindividuation or polarization is
weak, in comparison to that for group monitoring. It seems
that for this type of task, the decisions made by people in
groups are not made riskier by alcohol. The fact that group
members spend more time reaching their decisions sug-
gests they may be more likely to devote systematic atten-
tion to the decision task.
The element of control and restraint provided by a group
may explain why moderate social drinking appeals to many
people in task-related contexts (e.g., business lunches, away-
days, and conferences). Implications for promotion of safer
use of alcohol may be that policymakers should recognize
that, under some circumstances, social drinking might be
less risky than lone drinking. If group monitoring among
groups of drinkers is commonplace in some situations, drink-
ers may be relatively protected while with a group. They
may be able to “watch one another’s back.” In contrast, a
solitary drinker may be in a relatively more unpredictable
and vulnerable state when alone (e.g., when going home
from a party).
We are aware that some of these effects may depend
very much on what type of groups are involved, the degree
of deindividuation, and the type of task (cf. Postmes and
Spears, 1998). Sayette et al.’s (2004) finding that groups
were riskier when they had consumed alcohol, for example,
may be attributable to the particular 50/50 risk that partici-
pants were invited to take. In addition, it is possible that
riskiness of groups that consumed alcohol in Sayette et al.’s
(2004) study may be lower than that of individuals, had
any been tested under comparable conditions. In the present
study, the fact that the task involved financial risks for the
participants may have prompted a high level of systematic
processing among groups. The task involved repeated deci-
sions about mathematical relationships and, therefore, could
be looked upon as analytical. This may have affected the
way the participants approached the task. The results of
tasks in the contexts described here may be different when
groups are faced with a different task—one that relies on a
more emotional process, for example.
A further question surrounds the way alcohol might af-
fect groups that already have well-established norms (e.g.,
competitive groups, or those in which social identity is sa-
lient in an intergroup situation). Under these conditions, it
may be that alcohol promotes effects that are closer to the
patterns expected under the polarization or deindividuation
hypotheses. Future research is required, to see whether the
effects obtained in this experiment also occur for different
types of task (e.g., vigilance, recall, interpersonal percep-
tions, helping behavior, prejudice, etc.) and different types
of setting (informal versus formal, relationship-orientated
versus task-orientated). The present evidence demonstrates
that the effects of alcohol differ for groups and individuals
and, in certain contexts, may differ from the intuitive as-
sumptions about alcohol and its potentially negative effects,
a finding that is novel and potentially important. We hope
that this may encourage more exploration in the field and
we maintain that more research is required to examine the
underlying processes in detail.
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The present study is the first, to our knowledge, that has
examined effects of alcohol on decision-making for groups
versus individuals, controlling for group size, context, and
the volume of alcohol consumed. There is survey and quasi-
experimental evidence that social norms play a powerful
role in the amount of alcohol consumed by members of
different groups (see Borsari and Carey, 2003). It would be
useful if future research linked these two approaches, to
see whether and when groups may inhibit or exacerbate
risky drinking behavior.
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